#sign地缘政治基建 $SIGN The contract has clearly been modified, yet the comments section continues to circulate that old audit PDF. One of the most common illusions of security in blockchain projects often gets stuck here: the report is genuine, the code has indeed been audited, but the version of the contract you are looking at may not be the same one from that time. Once the version diverges, the phrase 'audited' can quickly transform into a vague market endorsement.

@SignOfficial The Proof of Audit done with OtterSec has an interesting point here. It does not stop at 'just putting the report up,' but creates a verifiable attestation from the audit summary, directly including fields like repo, findings, auditor, and timestamp in the schema. The completed summary will also be recorded in SignScan for easier future reference. This way, what you verify is not just what the PDF looks like, but which repository it corresponds to, who did it, and when it was released.

This matter may seem trivial, but it's very real. The market often too easily takes 'there is an audit' as a passphrase, but if you really want to be serious, at least a few questions should be clarified: which code was audited, has it been changed since, does the person issuing this conclusion have the corresponding authority, and can the cited evidence be further traced? The FAQ from Sign also breaks down the verification very clearly; besides the signature, you also need to check the schema, authority, status, and evidence. Without these, the more widely the audit conclusion spreads, the more it is likely to distort.

So what this line truly supplements is not just a sense of security, but a sense of origin. In the future, when projects claim they have been 'audited,' the market should not only look at a PDF screenshot. First, clarify 'which version was actually audited,' so that the remaining trust has a place to land.