The oil crisis of 1973 is often simply remembered as 'soaring oil prices, long queues at gas stations, and global recession.' However, what truly changed the world during this crisis was not merely the rise in oil prices, but the realization that energy is not just a commodity; it can also become a geopolitical weapon.

The current tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have brought this issue back into the discussion of the real world. However, this time, the nature of the crisis is different from that of 1973. Back then, oil-producing countries chose not to sell oil to certain nations; now, it is more likely that another situation will arise: oil still exists, but transportation has become so dangerous that no one dares to transport it.

First, it is important to clarify: what counts as 'closure'?

When discussing the Strait of Hormuz, it is easy for people to equate political threats or declarations with actual shipping disruptions. However, in the energy market, what truly determines the extent of the impact is not political statements, but whether the following three factors appear simultaneously:

The actual transportation function of the channel is damaged due to a significant decrease in vessel traffic.

Insurance companies stop underwriting, or the cost of war risk insurance skyrockets, leading to a sharp increase in transportation costs.

Crews and shipping companies actively avoid risks; even if theoretically navigable, they are unwilling to enter the area.

When these three events occur simultaneously, a strait, even if not physically blocked, will be 'closed' in a practical economic sense. In the recent situation, shipping data has shown that tankers are lingering near the strait, traffic is decreasing, and some insurance companies have canceled war risk insurance, while crews have also gained the right to refuse to enter conflict zones. These changes collectively weaken the transportation function of the strait.

Therefore, in the context of the energy market, 'closure' does not necessarily mean that the strait is completely blocked, but rather that it can no longer be used normally.

Second, why is the Strait of Hormuz so critical?

The Strait of Hormuz is regarded as a core node in global energy security because it handles a massive volume of energy transportation.

Data shows that approximately 20 million barrels of oil pass through this strait daily, accounting for about one-fifth of global oil consumption. In addition, a large amount of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports also rely on this route.

Theoretically, some oil-producing countries have indeed built pipelines to bypass the strait, such as the land oil pipelines from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, the transportation capacity of these alternative routes is far lower than the normal flow through the strait. Therefore, if the strait cannot be used for a long time, alternative channels can only relieve part of the pressure, but cannot completely fill the supply gap.

From the perspective of the energy system, this means that the Strait of Hormuz is actually a 'single point bottleneck' in the global energy supply chain. Once a serious disruption occurs here, the impact will quickly spread to global markets.

Third, the core logic of the 1973 oil crisis.

The 1973 oil crisis stemmed from the Arab oil-producing countries' decision during the Middle Eastern war to impose an oil embargo on some countries supporting Israel and reduce oil production. The result was a sudden tightening of global oil supply, with prices rapidly rising in a short period.

At that time, oil prices rose from about $3 per barrel to nearly $12, almost quadrupling within a year. What followed was a recession, high inflation, and energy shortages experienced by Western countries. Many countries had to implement energy-saving policies, establish strategic oil reserves, and rethink energy security issues.

Essentially, the crisis of 1973 was not due to a sudden lack of oil in the world, but because oil supply was redistributed by political forces.

Fourth, similarities between the two.

If we compare the 1973 oil crisis with the potential crisis in the Strait of Hormuz today, we can find several obvious common points.

First, both belong to supply shocks.

The rise in oil prices is not due to a sudden increase in global demand, but because the market expects future supply to decrease or become unstable.

Second, both will quickly impact the entire economic system.

Energy is the basic cost of nearly all industries. When oil prices rise, transportation, food, manufacturing, and electricity costs will increase, thus driving overall inflation.

Third, both will reinforce the political significance of energy security.

After 1973, countries began to establish strategic reserves and adjust energy policies; if the Strait of Hormuz loses functionality for a long time, similar policy adjustments may occur again.

Fifth, there are significant differences in today's world.

Although the two crises are logically similar, today's global energy system has changed significantly compared to the 1970s.

First, the sources of oil supply are becoming more diverse.

In addition to the Middle East, oil production in North America, South America, and Africa is also increasing, which has somewhat reduced dependence on a single region.

Secondly, countries have established strategic oil reserves.

Many countries' reserves of oil can be released in emergencies to cushion short-term supply shocks.

Third, today's risks are more concentrated in the transportation sector.

If a conflict occurs in the strait, the first to be affected is often not the oil wells, but shipping, insurance, and maritime security. This 'transportation bottleneck' will make it difficult for oil to reach the market smoothly, even though it exists.

Therefore, the current risk is more like a disruption in the supply chain rather than a simple decrease in output.

Sixth, the key to determining the scale of the crisis: time.

Whether the Strait of Hormuz will trigger a global energy crisis similar to that of 1973 depends solely on how long the disruption lasts.

If the strait is only disturbed for a short time, the market may primarily exhibit oil price fluctuations and financial market shocks.

If the disruption lasts for weeks to months, the global energy supply chain will begin to show significant pressure, and industrial production and energy prices may be more greatly affected.

If the disruption lasts for a longer period, the world economy may face energy shocks similar to those of the 1970s.

Seventh, Asia may be the most visibly affected.

Due to a large amount of Middle Eastern energy ultimately flowing to Asian markets, Asian economies are often more vulnerable in such crises. Japan, South Korea, China, and other countries that rely on imported energy are highly dependent on oil and gas transported through the Strait of Hormuz.

Therefore, once the strait is blocked for an extended period, energy prices, industrial costs, and economic growth in Asia may be significantly affected.

Whether the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz will replay the 1973 oil crisis does not have a simple answer.

A more accurate statement is:

If the strait is only temporarily disturbed, the global market may only experience a violent fluctuation in oil prices.

However, if the strait is unable to operate normally for a long time, the world economy may indeed face an energy shock similar to that of 1973.

The 1973 oil crisis made the world realize that energy supply can be controlled by political forces.

Today's crisis in the Strait of Hormuz reminds us that energy transportation itself may also become a key variable in geopolitical conflicts.