The more I think about Sign’s unified identity model, the more I keep coming back to one uncomfortable question: what happens when the one attestation at the center of everything stops working?
The architecture is clearly smart. One verified identity across the private CBDC side and the public blockchain side reduces duplication, keeps compliance aligned, and makes the whole system feel cleaner. But does that same elegance also create too much dependence on one credential?
If a citizen’s attestation is flagged, revoked, or technically compromised, what exactly happens next? Do they lose access across both environments at once? Is there a grace period? Is there a fallback credential? Is there any limited-access mode while the issue is being reviewed?
And maybe the bigger question is this: if one attestation is being positioned as the access layer for payments, benefits, and other state-linked services, then shouldn’t recovery be treated as part of the architecture, not as an afterthought?
I can see why the system is attractive.
I am just not sure the hard questions begin at adoption. They begin at failure.